'POWs and purge victims: attitudes towards party rehabilitation, 1956-57' by Dobson, M.
SEER, Vol. 86, No. 2, April 2008
POWs and Purge Victims: 
Attitudes Towards Party 
Rehabilitation, 1956–57
MIRIAM DOBSON
In 1954, Sophia Spitz initiated a correspondence with her former 
colleague, the leading Old Bolshevik, Elena Stasova.1 A German 
Communist, Spitz had arrived in Moscow in 1934 and worked with 
Stasova, until a false denunciation in 1937 led to fi ve years of exile in 
Kazakhstan. Rehabilitated as early as 1953, she asked for Stasova’s help 
in navigating the red tape that prevented her from drawing a personal 
pension. From her letters, it seems Spitz’s life after legal rehabilitation 
was still arduous, lonely and isolated. Increasingly, Spitz came to 
believe that reinstatement into the party was the only way her life 
would have meaning once more. 
In the autumn of 1955 she excitedly announced to Stasova that she 
had written to the Central Committee (CC): ‘I want to tell you that 
I can’t stand by on the sidelines any more. I must be in the party 
once more and again bear the distinguished title of member of the 
Communist Party.’2 Worried that Stasova might question her delay in 
addressing the party, Spitz explained in detail the emotional distress 
she had experienced over the last few months, especially as legal 
rehabilitation had brought on a nervous breakdown, the result of years 
of extreme stress. She wrote:
For nineteen years my soul has burnt. And then when salvation came, the 
organism didn’t hold out, and I found myself in hospital. The spiritual 
death-throes have passed [dushevnaia agoniia otoshla], and now I want to live 
and with all my strength to catch up with everything that I lost, with all 
my soul and burning love to deserve the title of member of the party, our 
dear [rodnoi] party. 
Spitz presented her story of exile and rehabilitation as one of death and 
rebirth, in which full resurrection could only happen with the party’s 
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1 The correspondence began when Spitz asked Stasova for information concerning her 
employment in the 1930s which the authorities required to assess her pension. Rossiiskii 
gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial´no-politicheskoi istorii (hereafter, RGASPI), f. 356 (E. D. 
Stasova, 1887–1973), op. 2, d. 41 (Correspondence with S. E. Spitz).
2 Ibid., l. 6.
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re-acceptance. In all this, she cast Stasova as her confessor. ‘Elena 
Dmitrevna!’, she wrote, ‘Please forgive me for writing so much, and 
forcing you to read what is in my soul.’3 
Spitz thus voluntarily re-entered the rituals that gripped the party in 
the 1920s and 1930s. She urged Stasova to collaborate in what Igal 
Halfi n has labelled the ‘communist hermeneutics of the soul’, and by 
which he means ‘the complex ritual of words and deeds that permitted 
the Party to determine who was worthy to belong to the brotherhood 
of the elect’.4 Spitz was not alone in wanting such rituals renewed (this 
time leading to re-admission to the brotherhood instead of expulsion).5 
The sister of Ia. B. Gamarnik wrote to Khrushchev in 1954 asking for 
the party to re-examine not just the case itself, but her whole being 
(for she too was a victim of repression): ‘I understand that anything 
written by me cannot serve as evidence, but I know that you are 
able to verify my whole life [proverka vsei moei zhizni], and it is this that 
I’m begging you to do.’6 Rather than fearing re-trials and renewed 
interrogation, several petitioners implored the authorities to recall 
them, and to read their souls — to borrow another purge victim’s 
terms — ‘in the light of truth’ (v svete pravdy).7 
In the wake of Stalin’s death, they had reason to be hopeful. 
Recognizing that order in the Gulag was increasingly diffi cult and 
costly to maintain, several members of the ruling elite were keen to 
inject dynamism back into Soviet system, and the task of downsizing 
the massive Gulag complex began by the end of March 1953.8 This 
process of sifting the camp population brought to the regime’s attention 
3 Ibid., l. 7.
4 Igal Halfi n, Terror in My Soul: Communist Autobiographies on Trial, Cambridge, MA, 2003, 
p. 7. See also, Michel Foucault, ‘About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: 
Two Lectures at Dartmouth’, Political Theory, 21, 1993, 2, pp. 198–227.
5 Spitz’s return to the party was made yet more diffi cult by the fact she was a member 
of the German party. She was told that the only way to be reinstated was to make the 
journey to Germany, but she was too ill to embark on this, and well into the mid-1960s 
was still writing petitions asking for party rehabilitation. 
6 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishchei istorii (hereafter, RGANI), f. 5, op. 47, 
d. 89, ll. 32–33, reproduced in A. Artizov, Iu. Sigachev, I. Shevchuk, B. Khlopov (eds), 
Reabilitatsiia: Kak eto bylo. Dokumenty prezidiuma TsK KPSS i drugie materialy, Mart 1953–fevral´ 
1956, Moscow, 2000, pp. 182–83. This volume also contains a short synopsis of Ia. B. 
Gamarnik’s life.
7 Tsentral´nyi arkhiv dokumental´nykh kollektsii Moskvy, f. 85 (Personal fi les of N. I. 
Kochin), op. 1, d. 491, ll. 16. 
8 As Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk have persuasively demonstrated, by the early 
1950s some members of the Politburo had become frustrated with the status quo and were 
already nurturing plans for how they could improve the running of the country, even 
though they knew that their ideas could not be put into practice until the leader was dead. 
They suggest that both Beriia and Malenkov were aware that policy shake-up was needed 
in agriculture and the Gulag, but were impotent faced with Stalin’s opposition to any 
signifi cant change. Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet 
Ruling Circle, 1945–1953, Oxford, 2004, chapter 5.
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many cases of injustice, and this seems to have acted as spur to further 
investigation and reform; petitions like Spitz’s were read at the highest 
level.9 The legal rehabilitation of purge victims began as early as 1953, 
and over 700,000 Soviet citizens convicted of counter-revolutionary 
crimes were legally rehabilitated by the end of the decade.10 Legal 
rehabilitation meant that the person was not only set free (as with the 
amnesties), but also that the charges laid against them were declared 
groundless. Party rehabilitation went one step further still. With their 
party cards returned to them, the repressed saw their reputation fully 
cleared: they could be Bolshevik heroes once more. 
Most had to wait until the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 
for party rehabilitation to become a realistic possibility, however. 
Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, delivered on the last night of the 
congress, projected a radically new image of the purge victims, using 
letters some of them had written to Stalin from prison. For example, 
Khrushchev quoted from R. I. Eikhe’s letter to Stalin:
If I were guilty of even a hundredth of the crimes they’re pinning on me, 
I wouldn’t dare to address this dying letter to you, but I haven’t committed 
a single one of the crimes I am charged with, and there has never been 
a shadow of baseness on my soul. I have never in my life told you even a 
half-word of untruth, and now, with one foot in the grave, I am also not 
lying to you.11
With Eikhe’s soul presented as clean and pure, Eikhe seemed a martyr 
about to die for the cause. So too with M. S. Kedrov, whose petition 
Khrushchev also cited: 
To die in a Soviet prison labelled a despicable traitor of his country — 
what can be more terrible for an honourable person [. . .] I believe that 
truth and justice will triumph. I believe, I believe.12 
Both letters resonated with their authors’ courage and faith in the 
Bolshevik cause and in using them, Khrushchev invited the party 
9 For detailed discussion of the nature of the Gulag returns, see Miriam Dobson, Khrush-
chev’s Cold Summer: Citizens, Zeks, and the Soviet Community after Stalin (hereafter, Khrushchev’s Cold 
Summer) unpublished book manuscript, particularly introduction, chapters 2 and 3.
10 Between 1954 and 1960, 892,317 counter-revolutionary cases were reconsidered and 
decisions over-turned and amended. Of these 715,120 were granted full rehabilitation. 
The documentation does not specify how many of these were posthumous rehabilitations. 
Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter, GARF) f. 7523, op. 95, d. 109, l. 11. 
Marc Elie notes that these fi gures do not include a further 16,849 who had been rehabili-
tated by the commissions of 1954 and 1956. See Marc Elie, ‘Les anciens détenus du Goulag: 
libérations massives, réinsertion et réhabilitation dans l’URSS poststalinienne, 1953–1964’, 
unpublished PhD dissertation, École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris, 2007 
(hereafter, ‘Les anciens détenus du Goulag’), pp. 346–47.
11 ‘O kul´te lichnost i ego posledsvtiiakh: Doklad pervogo sekretaria TsK KPSS tov. 
Khrushcheva XX s´ezdu Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza 25 Fevralia 1956 
goda’, Doklad N. S. Khrushcheva o kul´te lichnosti Stalina na XX s´ezde KPSS: dokumenti, Moscow, 
2002, pp. 51–119 (p. 75).
12 Ibid., p. 102. 
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to bask in the heroism and self-sacrifi ce that they had displayed. 
Men once vilifi ed as ‘enemies of the people’ were now lauded as the 
revolution’s true heroes, and the party was likewise heroic in its admis-
sion of previous error. As such, these former enemies merited read-
mission to the Party, albeit in many cases posthumously. In the fi ve 
years following Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, 30,954 Communists were 
rehabilitated into the party, possibly about three-quarters of them 
living.13
Ezhovshchina victims were not, however, the only ones to have suf-
fered under Stalin. In fact over half of the 30,954 people readmitted 
into the party came from a rather different cohort: they were men who 
had been taken as prisoners of war by the Germans. Upon repatriation 
after the war, these men had been treated with an enormous level of 
suspicion: serviceman, who had either escaped capture by breaking out 
of encirclement or who had been released from captivity, were investi-
gated by special NKVD camps, and many had to wait years to be 
allowed home.14 Of the 1,836,000 Soviet POWs who returned to their 
homeland, Mark Edele has calculated that 16 to 17 per cent were sent 
to penal battalions, and a further 16 to 17 per cent found themselves 
victims of the Gulag system.15 Whilst this meant that two thirds of 
former POWs were not explicitly punished, many continued to experi-
ence discrimination, including diffi culties fi nding and retaining work. 
Over a hundred thousand party members were expelled for this reason 
(though no criminal charges were laid against them).16 By 1961, 16,223 
13 RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, d. 1165, ll. 1–15, 30–32, 40, reproduced in A. Artizov, Iu. Sigachev, 
I. Shevchuk, B. Khlopov (eds), Reabilitatsiia: Kak eto bylo. Fevral´ 1956–nachalo 80-kh godov, 
Moscow, 2003 (hereafter, Reabilitatsiia: Kak eto bylo. Fevral´ 1956–nachalo 80-kh godov), pp. 354–
65 (p. 355). Documents, including this one, often do not stipulate the proportion of the 
rehabilitations awarded posthumously. However, records from the Party Control Commis-
sion suggest that in Moscow in 1956, forty-fi ve out of 196 party rehabilitations were post-
humous. This proportion might, however, not be typical. See RGANI f. 6 (Committee of 
Party Control), op. 6 (reports, references, verbatim accounts, protocols), d. 6, l. 15.
14 Pavel Polian, ‘The Internment of Returning Soviet Prisoners of War after 1945’, in 
Bob Moore and Barbara Hately-Broad (eds), Prisoners of War, Prisoners of Peace: Captivity, 
Homecoming and Memory in World War II, Oxford and New York, 2006, pp. 123–40 (p. 126–
27).
15 Mark Edele, ‘A “Generation of Victors?” Soviet Second World War Veterans From 
Demobilization to Organization, 1941–1956’, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of 
Chicago, Chicago, IL, 2004 (hereafter, ‘A “Generation of Victors”’), pp. 83–90. For similar 
fi gures, see also V. P. Naumov and L. E. Reshin, ‘Nezakonchennoe srazhenie Marshala 
Zhukova: O reabilitatsii sovetskikh voennoplennykh, 1954–1956gg.’, Istoricheskii Arkhiv, 3, 
1995, 2, pp. 108–27 (hereafter, ‘Nezakonchennoe srazhenie Marshala Zhukova’) (p. 108). 
These fi gures do not include repatriated civilians, an even bigger contingent that brings 
the number of returnees from the West to over fi ve million. See also V. N. Zemskov, 
‘Repatriatsiia sovetskikh grazhdan i ikh dal´neishaia sud´ba (1944–1956 gg.)’, Sotsiologicheskie 
issledovaniia, 1995, 5, pp. 3–13.
16 RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, d. 1076, ll. 1–18, 20–22, 29–35, 39, reproduced in Artizov et al., 
Reabilitatsiia: Kak eto bylo. Fevral´ 1956–nachalo 80-kh godov, pp. 252–68 (p. 264).
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of these men had had their party cards returned.17 Although they 
never enjoyed quite the acclaim as the purge victims did in Khrush-
chev’s Secret Speech, the former POWs also saw their status publicly 
revised. For example, in August 1957, the USSR Supreme Soviet 
granted the award Hero of the Soviet Union to M. P. Deviataev, a 
pilot whose exploits included not only outstanding fl ying missions 
and air battles, but also escape from a POW camp.18 Later, two fi lms 
extolled the bravery of the POW: the hugely popular 1959 production, 
The Destiny of Man, told of a POW who broke free from Nazi captivity, 
while Grigorii Chukhrai’s 1961 fi lm,Clear Skies, also portrayed the dis-
crimination and prejudice its POW-hero received upon returning back 
home.19 
In the years 1956 to 1957 party rehabilitation was thus sought by 
different groups amongst Stalin’s outcasts. Although both purge victims 
and POWs saw their diffi culties alleviated by the process of de-
Stalinization, their cases were not treated identically. Focusing in 
particular on one region of the RSFSR, this article traces the process 
of rehabilitation using the records preserved by the Vladimir obkom (the 
regional party committee).20 In the wake of the Secret Speech, purge 
victims were the fi rst to be readmitted to the party in Vladimir, though 
the courts’ decision to overturn a legal sentence was not necessarily 
a guarantee of successful party rehabilitation. The rehabilitation of 
POWs followed, but was more equivocal still. This local case-study 
shows that even if the leadership intended rehabilitation as a means 
to restore faith in the party and to re-ignite enthusiasm for the revolu-
tionary cause, revisiting the purges and the war often raised diffi cult 
questions in the localities. 
17 RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, d. 1165, ll. 1–15, 30–32, 40, reproduced in ibid., pp. 354–65 
(p. 363).
18 For the honours awarded to a former POW, see Pravda, 17 August 1957, p. 2.
19 Both fi lms received positive reviews in the press, though it was The Destiny of Man that 
seemed to touch viewers’ hearts the most deeply. It was a huge box-offi ce success, with 
almost 40 million viewers in 1960. For positive reviews of the fi lms, see Izvestiia, 22 February 
1959, p. 4; Izvestiia, 8 December 1959, p. 4; Pravda, 21 April 1961, p. 6. The fi gures for 
viewers are taken from an internal memo from the Cultural Section of the Central Com-
mittee reproduced in Ideologicheskie komissii TsK KPSS. 1958–1964: Dokumenty, Moscow, 1998, 
p. 258. For detailed discussion of the fi lms mentioned, see Josephine Woll, Real Images: 
Soviet Cinema and the Thaw, New York, 2000, pp. 88–91, 118–121, and Denise J. Youngblood, 
‘A War Remembered: Soviet Films of the Great Patriotic War’, American Historical 
Review, 106, 2001, 3, pp. 839–56. The two fi lms are: Sud´ba Cheloveka, directed by Sergei 
Bondarchuk, 1959, USSR and Chistoe Nebo, directed by Grigorii Chukhrai, 1961, USSR.
20 The fi les used are in the forms of protocols from the sessions of the Vladimir oblast´ 
biuro. As protocols (rather than minutes of the meeting), they do not record the discussions 
that must have accompanied each case, only the result. However, for each case there is 
normally over a page of commentary, explaining the person’s biography and the reasons 
for approving or rejecting the plea for rehabilitation.
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Rehabilitation in Vladimir
By the 1950s Vladimir, located 190 km east of Moscow, was a city of 
some 150,000 inhabitants. With a large tractor factory built during 
the war, Vladimir was now a growing industrial centre, as well as the 
administrative capital of the oblast´.21 Vladimir makes an interesting 
focus for an examination of the rehabilitation process, for exile and 
prison are particularly associated with both city and province. In pre-
revolutionary times prisoners sent into Siberian exile travelled from 
Moscow though Vladimir on a road popularly known as ‘Vladimirka’, 
and both before and after 1917, the city housed one of the most 
signifi cant prisons outside of Moscow.22 In the Soviet era, moreover, 
several cities in the oblast´ became notorious for their large ex-zek 
popul ations. Located just over 100km from Moscow, Murom and 
Aleksandrov housed many former prisoners and social marginals who 
were forced to reside outside of the capital and its immediate suburbs; 
both would experience signifi cant unrest during the Khrushchev 
era.23 
Many of the tasks facing the Vladimir leaders on a daily basis were, 
however, the same as for any regional party administration, including 
matters of discipline within the party ranks. Members of the biuro 
(bureau) of the Vladimir oblast´ party organization normally met on a 
monthly basis to rule on membership questions, including rehabilita-
tions, expulsions and warnings. Before the 20th Party Congress, the 
Vladimir biuro approved relatively few cases of rehabilitation.24 When 
the biuro met on 24 January 1956, a month before Khrushchev’s Secret 
Speech, the members considered just one case, that of Nikolai M., 
a sixty-year-old who had been a party member from 1928 until 1940 
when he was excluded for violating workplace discipline. In December 
1953 he had written a petition to the Party Control Commission (here-
after KPK) asking to be reinstated. The KPK decided that if he had 
support from the primary organization his request could be approved: 
in April 1955 a general meeting of all party members at his kolkhoz 
voted in favour of his readmission, as did the local district committee 
(raikom) in December 1955. It was now up to the biuro to give the fi nal 
seal of approval: he was readmitted to the party, though the years in 
which he had been expelled were not allowed to count towards his 
21 In 1959 the city population was 154,000. See A. M. Prokhorov (ed.), Bol´shaia Sovetskaia 
Entsiklopediia, 3rd edn., Moscow, 1971.
22 Anne Applebaum, Gulag: A History of the Soviet Camps, London, 2003, p. 484.
23 Vladimir A. Kozlov, Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion in the Post-Stalin Years, 
trans. Elaine McClarnand MacKinnon, Armonk, NY, 2002, pp. 193–214.
24 In a brief study of party rehabilitation in Kalinin oblast´ (now Tver´), Marc Elie found 
a similar pattern: in 1953, three-quarters of applications for party rehabilitation were 
rejected, where as four-fi fths were approved by 1956. See ‘Les anciens détenus du Goulag’, 
p. 379.
86-2-328SEE07.indd   333 12/6/2007   10:00:49 AM
334 sov i et  party  rehab i l i tat ion ,  1956–57
party service.25 Although he was the proud holder of a party-card once 
more, his record remained blemished.
It was not until two months after the Secret Speech that the pace of 
rehabilitation began to accelerate. On 18 April 1956, the biuro met 
again, and this time considered the cases of four purge victims who had 
recently been legally rehabilitated. They heard, for instance, the case 
of an Old Bolshevik, Marta V., a Latvian worker who had joined the 
party in 1906. In 1938 the Special Board (Osoboe Soveshchanie) had 
sentenced her to ten years’ imprisonment as a member of an anti-
Soviet, nationalist organization devoted to espionage and sabotage. On 
6 December 1955 she had been rehabilitated by the legal system, and 
she was now readmitted to the party, with a break (pereryv) marked from 
1938 to 1956.26 The biuro also gave party rehabilitation to Fedor S. who 
had worked as a factory foreman until he was arrested in 1948 for anti-
Soviet activity and sentenced to ten years by the Vladimir oblast´ court. 
Now working as a joiner at the same factory, he asked to be readmitted 
to the party and his petition was approved, again with a break (pereryv) 
marked on his party record.27 (Ironically, perhaps, the same meeting 
saw an expulsion in addition to these rehabilitations. Grigorii V., a 
pensioner who had criticized the Secret Speech, defended Stalin, and 
called Khrushchev a kukuruza (a sardonic reference to ‘maize’) lost his 
party card, showing that the process of de-Stalinization did not remove 
the party’s commitment to ensuring ideological conformity within its 
ranks.28)
On 9 May 1956, the CC issued an important instruction regarding 
rehabilitation: it ruled that when members were readmitted to the 
party, their membership should date from the fi rst entry into the party 
and should not in fact record a break (pereryv).29 From June 1956 
onwards, the Vladimir obkom largely followed this order. The following 
two years, from mid-1956 to mid-1958, would prove to be the most 
active in terms of party rehabilitation.30 In this period, many Ezhovsh-
china victims were readmitted to the party, some posthumously, often 
on the request of a wife, others as a result of their own petitions.31 
In all such cases, party service was counted from the date of fi rst entry 
into the party.
25 Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Vladimirskoi oblasti (hereafter, GAVO), f. p-830 (Vladimir 
obkom), op. 3, d. 148 (Protocols of the biuro sessions), l. 54.
26 Ibid., l. 273.
27 Ibid., l. 303.
28 Ibid., l. 276.
29 RGANI, f. 3, op. 14, d. 22, l. 126, reproduced in Artizov et al., Reabilitatsiia: Kak eto bylo. 
Fevral´ 1956–nachalo 80-kh godov, p. 86.
30 The pace of rehabilitation noticeably slows by the second half of 1958 and by the begin-
ning of 1960 there would be months when no rehabilitation cases at all were considered. 
See GAVO, f. p-830, op. 3, dd. 387, 389, 515, 638.
31 Ibid., d. 269, ll. 42–48.
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In the fi rst few months after the Secret Speech those being rehabili-
tated were mostly victims of the waves of repressions that hit the coun-
try in 1936 to 1938 and 1948 to 1949, but as already indicated these 
were not the only ones affected by the process of de-Stalinization. 
In April the CC created a commission headed by Marshal Zhukov 
to study the issue of POWs.32 Two months later, the commission 
reported on its fi nding, stating: 
Soviet fi ghters who were taken prisoner maintained their loyalty to the 
motherland, behaved courageously and staunchly bore all the burdens 
of captivity and the Hitlerites’ scorn. Risking their lives, many of them 
escaped from captivity and joined partisan forces to fi ght the enemy, or 
broke back through the frontline to join Soviet forces. 
The document stated that to be taken prisoner was not a crime and 
their treatment a ‘gross violation of Soviet legality’ and ‘massive arbi-
trariness’. The de-Stalinizing rhetoric of the Secret Speech was thus 
extended to include wartime injustices. The commission not only 
proposed extending an earlier amnesty to allow the release of former 
servicemen still serving sentences for surrender to the Germans, but 
also called for a review of cases with a view to legally rehabilitating 
those whose surrender had been unavoidable. Party organizations, 
soviets and workplaces were urged to end discrimination and to ensure 
that former POWs be given work according to their speciality and 
allowed to enrol at universities and colleges. The commission wanted 
the Minister of Culture and Minister of Defence to be charged 
with preparing books, brochures, fi lms, newspaper articles and plays 
depicting the heroic feats of people who had been taken prisoner and 
bravely escaped to join the partisans. In terms of party rehabilitation 
the report was also signifi cant: party obkoms were to review cases in 
which POWs had been expelled from the party.33 The commission’s 
proposals were brought into force by a CC decree of 29 June 1956.34
It was a further six months before the Vladimir biuro would hear its 
fi rst POW case. In December 1956 the biuro awarded rehabilitation to 
a soldier captured by the Germans in World War Two, though — in 
contrast to purge victims — it still recorded a break in the man’s 
party record.35 Over the following months there would be many 
32 APRF, f. 3, op. 50, d. 510, l. 10, reproduced in Artizov et al., Reabilitatsiia: Kak eto bylo. 
Fevral´ 1956–nachalo 80-kh godov, p. 73.
33 For a full list of the commission’s recommendations, see APRF, f. 3, op. 50, d. 511, 
ll. 23–43, reproduced in ibid., pp. 114–18. For thoughtful refl ection on the limitations of the 
commission’s proposals, see V. P. Naumov, ‘Sud´ba voennoplennykh i deportirovannykh 
grazhdan SSSR. Materialy komissii po reabilitatsii zhertv politicheskikh repressii’, Novaia i 
noveishaia istoriia, 1996, 2, pp. 91–112.
34 RGANI, f. 3, op. 14, d. 37, ll. 4, 60–65, reproduced in Artizov et al., Reabilitatsiia: 
Kak eto bylo. Fevral´ 1956–nachalo 80-kh godov, pp. 129–32.
35 GAVO, f. p-830, op. 3, d. 150, ll. 266–67.
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such cases. In May 1942, for example, Ivan Z. had found himself on 
occupied territory and encircled by the enemy. Fearing rumours that 
Germans executed card-carrying Communists, he buried his party 
documents before being taken prisoner.36 He was sent to Germany 
where he remained until the end of the war. After repatriation he 
returned to Kiev oblast´ in 1946, managed to locate the spot where he 
had buried his party documents, recovered them and brought them 
back to party authorities in Vladimir oblast´. Despite such efforts, he 
was excluded from the party.37 Petr S.’s story was similar. He had 
joined the party in 1938 and served in the Red Army during the war: 
fi nding himself on occupied territory, he buried his party card in 
a bottle in the ground before being captured and sent to work in 
Germany. In 1948 he returned to the site, dug up the ticket, and sub-
mitted it to the party, but again to no avail.38 Over the course of 1957 
both men were readmitted to the party, though their records both 
marked a break (pereryv) between their expulsion and their re-admission. 
While victims of Stalinist political terror in 1936 to 1938 were now 
being rehabilitated with their service to the party counted from their 
fi rst entry into the ranks, former POWs though readmitted, saw their 
records retain this pereryv. It implied that there had indeed been a 
reason for their absence during those years; their rehabilitation was 
half-hearted. Not all cases were approved for rehabilitation. A party 
member since 1942, Dmitrii K. claimed that he had destroyed his par-
ty card before being taken prisoner by the Germans. At the workshop 
for the disabled where he worked, the primary party organization sup-
ported his readmission to the party, as did the gorkom of Kol´chunin, 
but the obkom biuro remained suspicious, alleging that K.’s story had 
inconsistencies, in particular with regard to the date his card had been 
destroyed.39
To get a sense of the distribution of the number of readmissions 
and refusals over the course of 1956 to 1957, let us compare the records 
of two sessions of the Vladimir obkom biuro, one in the autumn of 1956, 
the second in the spring of 1957. In September 1956, the biuro met twice 
and in the course of the meetings approved readmission into the 
party of fourteen people. All of them had been convicted of counter-
revolutionary crimes, but recently granted legal rehabilitation: twelve 
of the fourteen cases dated from the years 1936 to 1938, the other two 
from 1947 and 1948.40 These were the high-points of Stalin’s political 
36 On the practice of burying party cards see Hiroaki Kuromiya, Freedom and Terror in the 
Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s–1990s, Cambridge, 1998, p. 265.
37 GAVO, f. p-830, op. 3, d. 270, l. 62.
38 Ibid., d. 269, l. 194.
39 Ibid., d. 269, l. 181.
40 Ibid., d. 150, ll. 41–94.
86-2-328SEE07.indd   336 12/6/2007   10:00:49 AM
337mir iam  dob son
terror identifi ed in Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, and for these victims 
the chance of rehabilitation seems extremely high, all of them seeing 
their party service restored from their fi rst entry into the party without 
a pereryv. POWs were not as yet seeing their cases reviewed (if in fact 
they were submitting petitions).
At the session of 16 April 1957, ten rather more diverse cases were 
considered: 
Case First Exclusion Decision Regarding Party 
Rehabilitation
1 1938 (shot) Membership posthumously restored from 
1906 (no break)
2 1937 Membership restored from 1924 (no break)
3 1939 Membership restored from 1926 (no break)
4 1937 Membership restored from 1928 (no break)
5 1944 (10-year sentence) Membership restored from 1919 (no break)
6 Excluded for falling 
into captivity in 1942
Membership shows break 1942–56
7 Excluded for falling 
into captivity in 1942
Membership shows break 1942–57
8 1938 Rehabilitation refused
9 1942 Rehabilitation refused
10 1937 Rehabilitation refused
There were thus fi ve successful cases in which the supplicant had been 
convicted for counter-revolutionary crimes and spent time in the camps, 
with four of these dating from the late 1930s; all had their party mem-
bership restored without a break.41 Two cases involved former POWs, 
who had not been convicted of any political crime but had nonetheless 
lost their cards in the immediate post-war years: their party rehabilita-
tion was approved, though in both cases their records still marked a 
break (pereryv).42 Three cases were refused, and thus warrant further 
examination.
The fi rst concerned a neighbourhood procurator (raionnyi prokuror) 
who had been expelled from the party by his primary organization in 
1937 accused of improper sexual relationships with his subordinates, 
bribe-taking, drunkenness and failing to carry out party tasks, leading 
to a conviction in 1938 for discrediting Soviet power and abusing his 
position. Although the date and nature of his arrest might mark him 
41 Ibid., d. 269, ll. 253–55, 268, 273–74.
42 Ibid., d. 269, ll. 259–60, 270.
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out a victim of the Ezhovshchina, the fact that he had not as yet been 
legally rehabilitated prevented the biuro from approving this case.43 The 
second refusal concerned a man who had been cleared of rumour-
mongering during wartime. His plea for party rehabilitation, however, 
was turned down on the grounds that he had all the same written 
anonymous letters which, though not a criminal offence, was behaviour 
deemed unworthy of a Communist.44 The third, a victim of 1937, had 
been fully cleared of the crime for which she had been convicted — 
spreading slander — but the biuro ruled her return to the party 
inadmissible on the grounds that she had earlier hidden her social 
origins, which included links with aristocracy and the emigration of 
1917.45
This third case was perhaps the most surprising, as few legally reha-
bilitated Ezhovshchina victims were refused re-entry into the party in 
1956. Yet by 1957, such decisions, while not common, were certainly 
not unheard of. In some cases, the biuro decided that the actions that 
originally led to arrest and conviction under article 58 might not 
constitute a crime as such, but they might still render the individual 
unworthy of membership to this exclusive brotherhood. The line 
seemed to be that even if they were not involved in any kind of 
criminal conspiracy, party members might have been rightfully 
expelled from the party for hiding class origins or for earlier political 
affi liations. 
Several such petitions were refused in 1957. Mikhail Sh., for 
example, had been expelled from the party in 1937 when the obkom 
discovered he had failed to disclose his service in the White Army, and 
then arrested. Sh. had died in prison in 1940, and it was his wife who 
now fought to clear his name. Even though the legal system had 
recently cleared him of his 1938 conviction for counter-revolutionary 
activity, the biuro decided that he had nonetheless breached party trust 
by attempting to cover up his past.46 Nikolai G. was also refused read-
mission.47 Having joined the party in 1917, this worker had become the 
director of a shop in the city of Aleksandrov by 1935, the year he was 
excluded from the party as a result of the proverka. His earlier links with 
one of the leaders of A. G. Shliapnikov’s Workers’ Opposition and his 
covert correspondence in the 1920s with a Trotskyist named Malikov 
fi rst cost him his party card, and then led a year later to a prison sen-
tence for counter-revolutionary activity. This conviction had now been 
overturned, but the biuro endorsed the party’s 1935 decision, deciding 
43 Ibid., d. 269, ll. 255–56.
44 Ibid., d. 269, ll. 278–79.
45 Ibid., d. 269, ll. 272–73.
46 Ibid., d. 270, l. 88.
47 Ibid., d. 269, l. 39.
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that if his links with the Workers’ Opposition and the Trotskyists had 
proved suffi ciently dubious for the 1935 party proverka to remove his 
card, he remained suspect in 1957.48 Karl M., a man of German 
nationality now in his late fi fties, was also refused readmission to the 
party on the grounds that he had hidden a previous political affi liation, 
namely his early membership to a youth SR (Socialist Revolutionary) 
movement. In addition, he had falsely claimed to have taken an active 
part in the 1917 revolution and hidden the fact that his father had 
owned a brick factory until 1904 and had possessed three homes.49 
In the new political mood, such offences might not warrant imprison-
ment or exile, and they did not make the perpetrators ‘enemies of 
the people’, but they might not be suitable candidates for party 
membership.
In one case, past membership of another political party did not 
preclude readmission to the communist brotherhood. Il´ia B., born 
1886, was a member of the SR party from 1905 until soon after the 
revolution, but as he had always honestly disclosed his past and had no 
further contact with the SRs after 1918/19, he was allowed his party 
card back in June 1957.50 The key seems to have been honesty: as in 
the 1930s, the party was now engaged in the task of re-interrogating 
these men and women to fi nd out about the nature of their past 
heresy and the truth of their relationship towards the party now. 
What patterns can be discerned? The most striking tendency is the 
distinction made between POWs and purge victims. Former POWs 
never saw their party record cleared as fully as many Ezhovshchina 
victims did, with the break marked on their party records continuing 
to cast a shadow over their reputation. The second pattern worthy of 
note is a shift between 1956 and 1957. In the second half of 1956 virtu-
ally all victims of 1936 to 1938 had been rehabilitated. In 1957, the vast 
majority of such cases were still being approved, but the obkom biuro 
was slightly less keen simply to follow the courts’ decisions. The legal 
convictions, particularly those produced by the Special Board, might 
be overturned as unlawful and arbitrary acts, but this did not neces-
sarily invalidate the party’s own checking mechanisms. Even if the sub-
sequent arrests and convictions were unlawful, the party checks of the 
mid-1930s had, the biuro seemed to imply, sometimes rightly identifi ed 
unsuitable and dissimulating party members in the years running up to 
the Great Terror. 
48 The proverka (verifi cation of party documents) was initiated in May 1935 in an attempt 
to bring order to regional party fi les and to trace missing and lapsed members. The process 
was continued in 1936 with the obmen dokumentov (exchange of party documents), whereby 
old dog-eared cards were to be replaced and unsuitable members expelled. Chris Ward, 
Stalin’s Russia, London, 1993, p. 111.
49 GAVO, f. p-830, op. 3, d. 270, l. 198.
50 Ibid., ll. 171–73.
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Instructions from Moscow
In its treatment of Ezhovshchina victims, the Vladimir obkom biuro was 
acting roughly in keeping with the signals sent out by the centre. 
In February 1956, Khrushchev had presented them as heroic martyrs, 
but in 1957, although the CC continued to promote rehabilitation, the 
picture was slightly less bright. In December 1956 the CC had sent a 
document to all party organizations, encouraging them to engage in 
increased political work with the masses, and to take a fi rm line against 
‘hostile elements’ (vrazhdebnye elementy). The letter warned of an increase 
in ‘enemy activity’, which it blamed primarily on the Hungarian upris-
ing and such foreign infl uences as Voice of America, the BBC and 
Radio Free Europe, though it also pointed the fi nger at returnees from 
the camps. The letter explained: 
Party organizations do not always take into consideration the fact that a 
signifi cant number of people have recently returned from places of impris-
onment, either as a result of amnesty or rehabilitation, or because their 
sentence was over. Most are now carrying out productive work, are 
actively engaged in social and political life, and conscientiously fulfi l their 
civic duties. However there are also those amongst the returnees who have 
taken a spiteful stance towards Soviet power, especially amongst the former 
Trotskyists, right opportunists, and bourgeois nationalists. They form 
groups around anti-Soviet elements and politically unstable people, trying 
to renew their hostile anti-Soviet activity. Party organizations should 
increase their educational work amongst those who have been amnestied 
and rehabilitated. 
Towards those who did seek to carry out anti-Soviet activities, the 
party should be decisive and take action ‘just as we have always taken 
action against those who are our enemies’.51 These suspicions regard-
ing former political prisoners suggested that the heroic status they had 
enjoyed in February 1956 was now rather less certain. 
In April 1957, the KPK reported on its work. It had in fact readmit-
ted to the Bolshevik ranks 99 per cent of the 2323 Ezhovshchina victims 
whose cases it had considered over the preceding twelve months. 
Yet despite this high rate of readmission, the report advised caution: 
Not all of those legally rehabilitated conduct themselves correctly. 
There are cases where individuals who have been reinstated in the party 
began to express anti-Soviet views. This was particularly the case during 
the notorious events in Poland and Hungary. 
Several examples were included as illustration, including the case of 
P. I. Pishal´nikov and A. M. Guber. After rehabilitation, Pishal´nikov 
51 RGANI f. 3, op. 14, d. 88, ll. 48–59, reproduced in Artizov et al., Reabilitatsiia: Kak eto 
bylo. Fevral´ 1956–nachalo 80-kh godov, pp. 208-14 (pp. 213–14). 
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criticized Soviet agricultural policy, praised British civil liberties, and 
argued for free speech. In a letter to the CC, he wrote: ‘When I was 
in exile, I felt morally better: I knew that there was nothing that I could 
do. Now I am rehabilitated, reinstated into the party, I am so sup-
pressed by bureaucrats, I can’t make a squeak.’ He was expelled from 
the party again. Guber, invited to join the 1 May celebrations in 1956, 
answered: ‘If you send me to the demonstration, I’ll go with a banner 
saying “Give the rehabilitated back everything you took off them”.’ 
His membership was now under review once again.52
The report seemed to be warning that not all those who were cleared 
of the charges laid against them were in fact suitable people for the 
noble title of Communist. As in Vladimir, party offi cials suggested that 
the political record of some returnees made them unworthy of party 
membership. The KPK had thus refused to readmit people who had 
links with the opposition in the 1920s, citing the examples of M. Ia. 
Kruchevskii, member since 1917, who had joined the Trotksyist opposi-
tion in 1926 and even printed Trotskyist literature, and M. S. Pesochin, 
a member since 1917, who had signed opposition platforms in the years 
1927 to 1928. Although the unlawful behaviour of the NKVD in the 
late 1930s might be condemned, the KPK suggested that the party’s 
own sifting had rightly identifi ed and rejected some unsuitable party 
members. In both Moscow and Vladimir, therefore, there was a subtle 
shift over the course of 1956 to 1957. Although the vast majority of the 
Ezhovshchina victims would still be approved in 1957, legal rehabilitation 
did not ensure readmission to the party. Political errors, however long 
ago, might still disqualify a person from party membership. 
With regard to the issue of POWs, however, we fi nd real divergence 
between the centre and the regions. Although in his Secret Speech 
Khrushchev had not bestowed on POWs the same attention as purge 
victims, the CC correspondence suggested that they too should be con-
sidered as victims, and even on occasion as heroes. The message from 
the CC in the summer of 1956 was that former POWs were as deserv-
ing of heroic status as Ezhovshchina victims. Marshal Zhukov had spoken 
of their courageous behaviour and their staunch forbearance in the 
Nazi camps. And yet in practice, Vladimir obkom was still distinguishing 
between the two categories of rehabilitation petition and readmitting 
the POWs to the party on far less favourable terms. In cases involving 
POWs, the party record still marked a pereryv. This distinction could in 
part be explained by the wording of the CC instructions. It stated that 
‘when readmitting to the party people who are fully cleared of the 
52 RGANI f. 6, op. 6, d. 1076, ll. 1–18, 20–22, 29–35, 39, reproduced in ibid., pp. 252–68 
(p. 255–56).
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charges laid against them’ they should not show any break.53 In fact, 
the POWs were not cleared of charges, because charges had never 
been laid in these cases; they had simply been expelled from the party 
under a cloud of suspicion even if cleared by the fi ltration camps. 
It seems, however, that the differentiation that the Vladimir party 
was making between purge victims and POWs was not just the result 
of bureaucratic ambiguity, but — according to leading party offi cials 
in Moscow at least — a sign of ingrained hostility towards POWs in 
the provinces. 
In addition to reporting on the rehabilitation of purge victims, the 
KPK report of April 1957 also condemned the attitude of regional 
party organizations towards former POWs. After praising the good 
work the KPK had been doing to reinstate POWs into the party, it 
stated: 
However it should be noted that until this time there are cases of excessive 
caution, when — without any good reason — the party organizations 
refuse party rehabilitation to people who were expelled as a result of their 
time in captivity or on occupied territory, even though they are com pletely 
trustworthy and hardworking people deserving of readmission to the 
party. 
It went on to provide an example of this excessive caution. 
Curiously enough, the case in fact came from Vladimir oblast´, and 
was quite similar to the case of Dmitrii K. described above. A former 
POW named A. I. Zakharov wished to be readmitted to the party and 
his claim was supported by the primary organization where he worked 
and by the Murom gorkom. When the case was forwarded on to the 
Vladimir obkom, however, it was refused. Despite the lack of any evi-
dence of incorrect behaviour by Zakharov during his time in captivity 
and despite the good reports from his workplace, the obkom decided that 
they should refuse him because he had been out of the party for such 
a long time.54
The KPK expressed particular concern that only a very small 
number of workers and collective farmers amongst former POWs were 
appealing for reinstatement in the party, though they had constituted 
a very large proportion of the POW contingent. The KPK argued that 
additional measures needed to be taken to familiarize the grass-roots 
party organizations with the CC decrees of 1956 aimed at easing the 
rehabilitation of POWs.55 According to the KPK, therefore, there 
was a marked failure on the part of the local party organizations to 
53 RGANI, f. 3, op. 14, d. 22, l. 126, reproduced in ibid., p. 86.
54 RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, d. 1076, ll. 1–18, 20–22, 29–35, 39, reproduced in ibid., pp. 252–68 
(p. 265).
55 Ibid.
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implement the full rehabilitation of POWs that was intended by the 
CC decree of June 1956.
Conclusion
This article uses the records from Vladimir obkom to trace the rehabi-
litation record in one oblast´ of Soviet Russia in the wake of the Secret 
Speech. It suggests that rehabilitation was not automatic. Most 
Ezhovshchina victims saw their appeals approved, and their full party 
service recognized, but rehabilitation was not guaranteed, even for 
those whose convictions had been overturned. Earlier deceptions of 
the party might no longer be considered a state crime, but they still 
disqualifi ed the culprit from membership in the brotherhood, just as 
they had in the proverka and obmen dokumentov of the early and mid-1930s. 
The party was not simply following the legal decisions and overturning 
unlawful sentences but also trying to identify the truthful, committed 
and pure heroes that party lore would have the Bolsheviks be.
The second argument is that the regions might have been less ready 
to follow Moscow’s lead with regard to POWs than they were with 
purge victims. By the spring of 1957, the Party Control Commission in 
Moscow was frustrated with some regions’ failure to respond to the 
initiatives launched the previous summer and their ongoing reluctance 
to recognize fully the victim status of those captured by the German 
forces during World War Two. 
Such attitudes were not in themselves new. Mark Edele’s study of 
war veterans suggests that regional authorities already displayed 
signifi cant hostility towards former POWs in the late Stalinist period, 
even when Moscow urged them otherwise. Many were unable to fi nd 
stable employment, or were sacked for no reason other than local 
offi cials’ suspicions. In these years, the repatriation administration 
(attached to the Council of Ministers in Moscow) received increasing 
numbers of letters from people who had lost their jobs simply because 
they had been in German imprisonment. A memo from the leaders of 
the repatriation administration to the CC in July 1949 described their 
frustration: responding to petitions from POWs unfairly dismissed from 
their employment, they would frequently instruct the local authorities 
to re-hire the worker, but were simply refused.56 They were seemingly 
unable to break down this ingrained resentment towards former 
POWs. 
How do we explain the hostility of local authorities both in the late 
Stalinist years and in 1956 to 1957? In Vladimir there may have been 
specifi c factors — namely the region’s diffi culty in coping with the 
legacies of the Stalinist Gulag — that made the authorities particularly 
56 Edele, ‘A “Generation of Victors?”’, pp. 171–76 and pp. 397–408.
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hesitant when dealing with rehabilitation matters. Yet this does not 
explain the caution regarding POWs specifi cally. Here we must look to 
broader factors, in particular to the meanings attached to war. Accord-
ing to Amir Weiner, ‘the war superseded other foundational myths, 
such as the civil war and the collectivisation of the countryside, which 
were increasingly viewed as distant, irrelevant, and in some cases, too 
controversial because of their traumatic legacy’.57 In the construction 
and dissemination of these new myths, those who had themselves 
experienced the war played a key role. Weiner argues that the 
‘hegemonic status of the myth of the war’ was not only the result of 
state propaganda and policy, but also refl ected the strength with which 
the myth was articulated in the localities, particularly by ‘the peasant-
soldiers, for whom the war turned into an autobiographical point of 
reference and point of departure’.58
The myths of the war, and their importance for the post-war party 
elites, help us to understand the decisions regional party authorities 
made regarding rehabilitation, for war veterans represented a consider-
able force in local party structures.59 Perhaps these men believed the 
rehabilitation of former POWs somehow detracted from their own 
glory. Although the Khrushchev era witnessed attempts to revisit the 
subject of war and to allow for discussion of trauma and pain, as 
well as heroism, there may have been resistance to the revision of 
war myths, especially amongst those who had built their career in its 
immediate aftermath. (The extent to which a broader Soviet public 
harboured similar suspicions towards former POWs is uncertain and a 
subject warranting further study.)60 
What seems certain, however, is that the 1950s were disorientating 
years. A diverse range of Stalin’s outcasts, including criminals, émigrés, 
Vlasovites, collaborators and deported social and ethnic groups, as well 
as purge victims and POWs, were all promised some kind of reprieve. 
Transformed into enemies, outsiders and marginals, during the long 
years of Stalin’s rule, they were now the benefi ciaries of a range of 
57 Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik 
Revolution, Princeton, NJ, 2001, p. 8.
58 Ibid., pp. 20–21.
59 Weiner’s study of post-war Vinnitsa demonstrates that veterans were an important force 
in party and governmental structures. Although Edele qualifi es this picture, he agrees that 
veterans were an important group in the leadership of local party organizations. Ibid., 
pp. 43–81; Edele, ‘A “Generation of Victors?”’, pp. 269–90.
60 Jeffrey Jones’s work on the occupied city of Rostov suggests that in the aftermath of war 
citizens shared the regime’s hatred of active collaborators, but were generally far more 
sympathetic to returning POWs and repatriated citizens. In his conclusion, Jones predicts 
popular support for Khrushchev’s relaxation towards these groups, though his study stops 
in 1948. Jeffrey W. Jones, ‘“Every Family Has Its Freak”: Perceptions of Collaboration in 
Occupied Soviet Russia, 1943–1948’, Slavic Review, 64, 2005, 4, pp. 747–70.
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policies intended to re-integrate them into the Soviet community once 
more.61 These initiatives were, however, diffi cult and contested. Not 
everyone welcomed such change, perhaps fearing it might in some way 
cast a shadow over their own stories. Some even feared a reversal of 
fates: the rehabilitation of one group of outcasts, they worried, might 
mean the identifi cation and punishment of a new cast of enemies.62 
While the diffi culty in re-integrating purge victims into society has 
already attracted some scholarly attention, this article suggests that they 
were not the only group whose return would prove problematic during 
the Khrushchev era.63 The place of terror in the Soviet past was of 
course highly problematic, but evidence from 1956 to 1957 suggest that 
the myths of war were also fragile, and potentially a source of tension 
as much as of pride.
61 On the diffi culties concerning the release and re-integration of criminals, see Miriam 
Dobson, ‘“Show the Bandits No Mercy!”: Amnesty, Criminality and Public Response in 
1953’, in Polly Jones (ed.), The Dilemmas of De-Stalinisation: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change 
in the Khrushchev Era, London and New York, 2006, pp. 21–40; for legislation concerning the 
changing status of émigrés and different groups of alleged collaborators, see the documents 
in Naumov and Reshin, ‘Nezakonchennoe srazhenie Marshala Zhukova’; on the problem-
atic return of Ukrainian nationalists, see ‘The Empires Pay a Visit: Gulag Returnees, East 
European Rebellions, and Soviet Frontier Politics’, Journal of Modern History, 78, 2006, 2, 
pp. 333–76; on special settlers, see V. N. Zemskov, Spetsposelentsy v SSSR, Moscow, 2005, 
chapter 4.
62 Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, chapter 3.
63 For exploration of the purge victims’ return and their place in late and post-Soviet 
society see, in particular, Nanci Adler, The Gulag Survivor: Beyond the Soviet System, New 
Brunswick, NJ, 2002, and Kathleen Smith, Remembering Stalin’s Victims: Popular Memory and 
the End of the USSR, Ithaca, NY, 1996.
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